资本市场监管有效性的判断标准.pdf

Criterion for Judging Effectiveness of Supervision in Capital Market Renjie Huang, Xuguang Hao Institute of International Economy, University of International Business and Economy, Beijing Email: renjiehuang@ Received: Nov. 5th th th , 2013; revised: Nov. 11 , 2013; accepted: Nov. 25 , 2013 Copyright © 2013 Renjie Huang, Xuguang Hao. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution Li- cense, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Abstract: This paper puts forwards a beforehand criterion for judging the effectiveness of supervision in capital market, which makes use of agency by agreement model and concept of encouragement and consistent measure- ment. Based on this criterion, this paper holds that the higher the encouragement and consistent measurement, the more effective the supervisory policy. An analysis on beforehand criterion for judging has been made in this pa- per. This analysis shows that if we lay down an effective supervisory policy, we must reform the system of en- couragements and penalties to the investment institutions, impel them to do something which benefits the inves- tors and development of the market, and make speculation declined steadily in Chinese stock market. This paper not only makes an assessment by variation in super-profit, but also makes an overall assessment of the supervi- sion policy in capital market through the estimation of fluctuating rate in the market around the exercising su- pervisory policy, and holds that we must reduce the ratio of fluctuation. This is a goal of the supe