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Empirical Models of Entry
Empirical IO: Lecture 4
Chun-Yu Ho, SJTU
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991)
• Develop new empirical models of market structure from
game-theoretic models of entry
– Firms profits depend on their competitors actions
– Do not observe entrants revenues or costs
– Use the relationship between market size and firms’ entry to
infer the entry threshold in terms of population
• Construct two measures of the effects of entry
– Competitive cost of entry
– Presence of entry barriers or differences in entrants fixed costs
– Focus on the entry threshold of an additional firm
• Examines the market for 5 retail and professional industries
Monopoly Duopoly Markets
• Monopoly market
– 1 firm enters for non-negative long-run profits
– The next most profitable potential entrant firm does not enter
due to negative long-run profits
π 0 π 0
≥
1 2
• Duopoly market
– 2 firms enter for non-negative duopoly profits
– Other potential entrants do not enter due to negative profits
π ≥0 π 0
2 3
• In markets with N firms, N firms expect non-negative profits
and the other potential entrants expect negative profits
Demand Cost
• Assume the demand functions of market m is
( , ) ( )
Q d Z P ×S Y
• Q is the total unit of sales
• d(Z,P) is the demand function of a representative consumer
• S(Y) is the number of representative consumers
– Z does not includes S [assume the market size does not affect consumers’
tastes]
– Assume holding prices constant, a doubling of S will double unit sales
• Assume
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