财务控制【外文翻译】.doc

原文： Financial Control Effective corporate governance and financial control includes the use of monitoring and incentive mechanisms to align divergent interests between shareholders and managers and encourage the creation of shareholder value. Value-based management systems (VBM) provide an integrated management strategy and financial control system intended to increase shareholder value by mitigating agency conflicts. In concept, VBM reduces agency conflicts and helps create shareholder value since it reveals value-increasing decisions to employees, allows for easier monitoring of managers’ decisions, and provides a method to tie compensation to outcomes that create shareholder value. However, the degree to which VBM systems actually improve the economic performance of publicly held firms is an open question. To gain insight into this issue, we examine the use and economic efficacy of value-based management systems by 84 firms that adopt VBM systems from 1984 to 1997. We investigate two related research questions: (1) Does the adoption of a VBM system improve economic performance? And (2) What factors enhance or hinder the effectiveness of VBM systems? Our primary goal is to examine whether the adoption of a VBM system improves economic performance. We recognize that firm performance and the decision to tie compensation to a VBM metric can be endogenous, which creates a potential sample selection bias. For instance, firms that are performing poorly face tougher challenges to creating economic value and could be more likely to tie compensation to VBM to provide managers the incentives to overcome these challenges. Alternatively, managers who expect to achieve a certain level of performance can negotiate a compensation contract based on the VBM metric that essentially assures a bonus payout. Our sample includes firms that base compensation on VBM metrics, but also firms that use VBM for analysis and evaluation only. Thus, we can examine why firms choose to tie compe