基于过度自信和监督机制的动态激励契约研究.PDFVIP

25 5 Vo.l 25 No. 5 2010 10 JOURNAL OF SYSTEM S ENGINEERING Oct. 2010 庄新田, 王 健 (, 110004) : 将行为金融学与激励理论相结合, 在经理人过度自信和监督机制同时存在的条 下, 通过建立契约模 型, 研究公司股东与经理之间的动态最优激励. 结果表明, 过度自信和监督机制均可使最优激励契约变得廉 价, 从而在 一定程度上减少公司的代理成本, 两者在解决股东和经理人之间委托代理问题中, 均对激励契约 具有替代作用. 同时, 随着经理任期的增加和工作经验的丰富, 一定条 下过度自信对激励契约的替代作用 将逐渐减弱, 最优的激励最终会提高至提供给理性经理激励的水平. 该结论在我国企业的运用, 一方面可以有效弥 补现有激励方式的不足, 为企业节约激励成本, 另一方面能够有力地解释经理人中存在的 异象!. : ; ; ; : F 30. 91 : A : 1000- 57 1( 2010) 05- 0642- 09 Study on dynamic optimal incentive contractsbased on overconfidence and supervisemechanism ZHUANGXintian, WANG Jian ( School of Business Adm inistration, N ortheastern U niversity, Shenyang 110004, China) Abstract: By comb in ing the behavioral finance theory and the incentives theory, th is paper resear ches the dynam ic optmi al incentives bewt een shareholders and the manager. The resu lt show s that both overconfidence and supervision make the incentive contracts becom e cheap, and reduce the a gency costs. They can substitute for the incentive contract in cop ing w ith the principalagent prob lem. But overconfidence of them anagerw ill decline gradually under some cond itions, and the opti mal incentivesw ill regress to the level for rationalmanagers finally. The application of th is result in Ch inese corporations can make up the shortage of existing incentive mode and reduce the corpora tions∀ costs, and can also exp lain the abnorm ity! effectively. ey words: optmi al incentives; overconfidence; supervision mechanism; m anager 0 ,